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PROSECUTING CRIMES AGAINST CULTURE: THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE AL-MAHDI AND NTAGANDA
CASES TO THE ICC APPROACH TO CULTURAL PROPERTY
PROTECTIONS
Samira Mathias *
INTRODUCTION
Nestled on the Dalmatian Coast, the Old Town of Dubrovnik maintained
several 15th and 16th century historic structures from its time as a prospering
maritime capital. 1 In 1979, the Old Town of Dubrovnik was inscribed on the
World Heritage List, conferring World Heritage Status to all the structures
within. 2 This meant that even the walls were protected. The collective fabric of
the town had a significance that transcended the value of each individual
building. 3 But in October 1991, Dubrovnik was engulfed in hostilities between
the Yugoslav People’s Army and Croatian forces. 4 Over the next few months,
several buildings were destroyed or damaged by indiscriminate shelling. 5
The Old Town became a symbolic landmark in the case of Prosecutor v.
Strugar, when the former General (J.N.A.) Commander Pavle Strugar was
prosecuted for destruction of cultural property under Article 3(d) of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).6 In fact, the
Trial Chamber noted in that case that the Old Town is legally distinct from the
rest of Dubrovnik because it was protected in its entirety by virtue of its World
Heritage listing. 7 Dubrovnik was destined to symbolize another development of
cultural heritage law: the recognition of intangible cultural heritage. Every year
since 1190, the town has celebrated the festivity of Saint Blaise. 8 The festival is
marked by an ephemeral atmosphere of ringing church bells, the release of white
doves, and a conglomeration of tourists and worshippers who gather to pay
Samira Mathias is a University of Oxford 2021 Bachelor of Civil Law Candidate.
George Wright Forum, Dubrovnik’s Old City: The Destruction of a World Heritage Cultural Site, 11
GEORGE WRIGHT SOCIETY 11, 11 (1994).
2
Croatiaweek, Croatia’s 10 UNESCO World Heritage sites, CROATIAWEEK, (June 1, 2020)
https://www.croatiaweek.com/croatias-10-unesco-world-heritage-sites/
3
See generally George Wright Forum, supra note 1.
4
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement ¶ 1.
5
Id. ¶ 50.
6
See generally id.
7
See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 279, 327 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005).
8
Festivity of Saint Blasie, the patron of Dubrovnik, UNESCO: INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE
https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/festivity-of-saint-blaise-the-patron-of-dubrovnik-00232.
*
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homage to Saint Blaise. 9 In 2009, this feast was inscribed on the Representative
List of Intangible Cultural Heritage under the Convention for the Safeguarding
of Intangible Cultural Heritage. 10
Cultural heritage laws have evolved over time, with the recognition that
cultural differences shape aspects of religion, art, or history that are most
important to communities. Generally, some communities focus on tangible
infrastructure as the pivot of their historical heritage, others elevate an intangible
aspect—a religious practice, ritual, or tradition—to prime importance.
Cognizance has expanded over time to include, not just oral traditions and
intangible values, but also historic areas, natural landscapes, and impermanent
religious or cultural structures, where the process of periodic building is of
significance to the community.
While heritage laws protect cultural heritage during peacetime, generally, it
is during a situation of war that properties and values most important to
communities come under distinctly targeted or incidental threat. But
international law does not manifest any consistent definition of what qualifies as
cultural property or the degree of protection extended to it.
This Article will unfold in three segments. Part I offers an overview of
international law protections of cultural property. This sets the stage for the rest
of the Article to explore the importance of Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv) of
the Rome Statute in the broad scheme of cultural property protection under
international law. Next, Part II will raise important questions about the
interpretation of these Articles. Finally, Part III will identify the scope of these
Articles and the limitations imposed by the Statute.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROTECTIONS OF CULTURAL
PROPERTY

There are several instruments under public international law and, more
specifically under international humanitarian law, to protect cultural property
during armed conflict. Some of the most important ones are discussed below:

9
Decision of the Intergovernmental Committee: 4.COM 13.31, UNESCO: INTANGIBLE CULTURAL
HERITAGE https://ich.unesco.org/en/decisions/4.COM/13.31.
10
See generally Festivity of Saint Blasie, supra note 8.
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A. The Hague Convention (IV) (1907)
Article 27 of the Hague Regulations protected buildings dedicated to
religion, art, science, charitable purpose, historic monuments, hospitals, and
places for the sick and wounded during bombardments or sieges. 11 Four things
were important to note about this provision.
First, while these buildings were protected from attack as long as they were
not being used for military purposes, there was no provision within the Hague
Regulations that prohibited the use of these buildings for military purposes. 12
Second, Article 27 only applied to sieges and bombardments. 13 Article 56
was a corresponding provision applicable to situations of belligerent occupation
that protected cultural institutions that were either private or the property of the
State, from seizure, destruction, and willful damage. Third, while the only
justification for bombardment was when the building was used for military
purposes by the opposing side, Article 27 did not in and of itself prohibit
destruction by torching, demolishing, razing, or other means if the sole purpose
was to create impediments for the enemy, i.e. if the action could be justified by
military necessity. 14 Finally, the Hague Regulations did not include any
provisions for individual criminal responsibility. Notably, the 1907 Regulations
have received customary law status. 15 This is particularly pertinent as it reserves
a customary status for the protection of cultural property during armed conflict.
B. The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict (1954)
Article 1 of the 1954 Convention expanded the protection of cultural
property by defining it as “both movable and immovable property of great
importance to the cultural heritage of every people.” 16 This extension to movable
property included collections of books, archives, and reproductions thereof, as
well as buildings that house such important movable cultural property whether
11
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 27, Oct. 18, 1907, International Peace Conference, The
Hague, Official Record (Oct. 18, 1907) [hereinafter Hague Regulations, 1907].
12
ROGER O’KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT 25 (James Crawford
et al. eds., 2006)
13
See Hague Regulations, 1907, supra note 11, art. 27.
14
O’KEEFE, supra note 12, at 25–26.
15
S.C. Res. 25704, ¶ 35, (May 3, 1993); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 89 (July 9).
16
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Aug. 7, 1954, 249
U.N.T.S. 240, art. 1 [hereinafter CPCPAC].
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for preservation, exhibition, or as shelter. 17 This was a particularly high
threshold to meet. As a result, properties would need to constitute “heritage” to
receive protection. Furthermore, while protection was extended to situations of
both internal and international armed conflict, there were no treaty provisions
for criminal prosecution. Article 28 transferred the burden of prosecution and
penalization of individuals to contracting parties who would have to effect the
penalties through internal legislation and judicial activities. 18
C. The UNESCO 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972)
In the 1950s, the planned construction of the Aswan Dam across the River
Nile in Egypt was criticized for posing flooding dangers to several heritage sites
in the associated valleys, including the famous Abu Simbel temples. 19 This
raised international concerns. The temples were successfully relocated with
financial and technical aid from UNESCO and international donors. 20 However,
this sparked a movement, and the 1972 World Heritage Convention
materialized. The protective scope of the Convention is restricted due to the
necessity for the immovable property, to have “outstanding universal value”. 21
Whether the object qualifies to this standard of “outstanding universal value” is
something the Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage determines. 22 For these purposes, the sites must
meet at least one of six cultural criteria. 23 Alternatively, one of the four natural
criteria could also be satisfied for the purposes of enlisting natural heritage. The
protection, management, authenticity, and integrity of properties are also
considered important when evaluating whether a site should be listed. 24 The
definition of cultural property was expansive in that it not only protected
buildings and monuments, but also sites, which can best be described as
combined works of man and nature that are ascribed importance for aesthetic,

17

Id.
Id. art. 28.
19
See generally Gihane Zaki, Abu Simbel: the story of an extraordinary rescue, 90 WORLD HERITAGE
22, 22–30 (2019).
20
Id. at 30.
21
See Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, (Nov. 16, 1972) 1037
U.N.T.S. 15511, art. 1); CPCPAC, supra note 16, art. 1.
22
1037 U.N.T.S. 15511, art. 11.
23
Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, UNESCO Doc.
WHC.17/01, (Jul. 12, 2017) par. 77, https://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines/.
24
Id. ¶ 78.
18
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ethnological, or anthropological values. 25 However, the Convention does not
criminalize damage or destruction to such sites. 26
D. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)
The Rome Statute has two distinct provisions on the protection of cultural
property during armed conflict—Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv). Arguably,
offenses against cultural property would also be subsumed within the war crimes
of extensive destruction and appropriation of property, 27 destroying or seizing
the enemy’s property, 28 and pillage. 29
This manifested in the jurisprudence of the court in the Katanga Judgment
where destruction of property, including churches and schools, were prosecuted
or considered for prosecution under the war crime of destroying the enemy’s
property. 30 These two Articles have great significance due to their inclusion in
the Statute. As they are lex specialis provisions for protection of cultural
property within the Rome Statute, they automatically envision individual
criminal responsibility for criminal acts during war time, as opposed to the
Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention and the World Heritage Convention,
which lack penal provisions. 31 The 1954 Hague Convention also lacks automatic
criminalization, instead requiring states to implement disciplinary or penal
measures within the scope of their “ordinary criminal jurisdiction.” 32 These
Articles also provide an option for the international community when a State
that has jurisdiction over the case is unable or unwilling to prosecute him, 33 or
when there is inaction on the part of that State. 34
Finally, in light of widespread attacks on cultural heritage in Mali, Iraq, and
Syria, the protection of cultural property has become a pressing priority. 35 If the
1037 U.N.T.S. 15511, art. 1.
See generally id.
27
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court common art. 7-8, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
28
Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xiii), (e)(xii).
29
Id. arts. 8(2)(e)(v), (b)(xvi).
30
See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. IIC-01/04-01/07, Judgement pursuant to article 74 of the Statute,
¶¶ 882, 922, 924, (Mar. 7, 2014).
31
See generally 1037 U.N.T.S. 15511; CPCPAC.
32
See CPCPAC, supra note 16, art. 28.
33
Rome Statute, supra note 27, arts. 17 (1)(a), (b).
34
Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 9, Judgement on the Appeal of Mr.
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the
Case, ¶ 78, (Sept. 25, 2009).
35
See generally UNESCO strengthens action to safeguard cultural heritage under attack, UNESCO:
MEDIA SERVICES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/unesco_
25
26
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ICC discovers a way to extend jurisdiction to situations where the perpetrator is
a national of a non-party State, or where the crime was committed on the territory
of a non-party State (as seen with ISIS in Iraq), these provisions in the Rome
Statute would become critical to prosecutions of cultural crimes.
II. RAISING IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ROME STATUTES
A. The Evolution of Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv)
Article 8(2)(b)(ix) and Article 8(2)(e)(iv) apply to international and noninternational armed conflicts, respectively.36 The Articles mirror each other. The
Preparatory Committee in 1996 initially contemplated a rather high threshold
for the protection of cultural property, which included: clearly recognized
historic monuments, works of art, or places of worship; constituting the cultural
and spiritual heritage of peoples; specially protected under the aegis of
international organizations; resulting in extensive destruction from the attack;
and not used by an adverse party as part of its military effort and not within the
immediate proximity of its military objectives. 37 The final version adopted by
the Preparatory Committee was chosen to reflect Article 27 of the Hague
Regulations of 1907, requiring the following elements: there had to be an attack;
the attack had to be intentional; the attack had to be directed against one or more
buildings; the buildings had to be dedicated to religion, education, art, science,
or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places for the sick
and wounded; and the buildings were not military objectives. 38
Over the course of the Preparatory Committee’s deliberations, several
versions were scrutinized. The final version was chosen with caution and
specific intent. However, it must be strictly interpreted per fundamental
principles of criminal justice. So, why was this version of the Rome Statute
chosen? The next Section explores answers to these questions. Each of these
crimes have contextual elements for international or non-international armed
conflicts, but the elaboration of contextual elements has been omitted in order
to focus on the specific elements that are the crux of the protection. The

strengthens_action_to_safeguard_cultural_heritage_und/.
36
Rome Statute, supra note 27, arts. 8(2)(b)(ix), (e)(iv).
37
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AN
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTE 90, (2005).
38
Draft Consolidated Text, Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court 11-21 February 1997 Working Group on definition of crimes, A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.2, (Feb. 20,
1997).
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discussion below describes the salient features of the present versions of Articles
8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv).
1. There Must be an “Attack”
In Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, the Court relied on the definition of “attack” in
Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to
explain that attacks are “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in
offence or in defence.” 39 This definition applies to non-international armed
conflicts, and the corresponding definition in Article 49 of Additional Protocol
I applies to international armed conflicts. 40 Although there are conflicting
opinions within the ICC, there is strong evidence for the view that an attack
includes combat action that must occur during battle and cannot occur after the
property or the person in question is under the control of the adversary. 41 Rules
of treaty interpretation laid down in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) have customary status, and have been used by
the Court for the purposes of interpretation of the Statute. 42 This Part uses the
interpretative tools within Articles 31 and 32 to support the said interpretation
of “attack.”
a. Textual Approach
The ordinary meaning of a treaty’s terms can be ascertained by reading the
terms in the context of the entire text. 43 Article 8 includes two types of crimes—
conduct crimes and result crimes, with corresponding mental elements. 44 The
first penalizes the conduct that the perpetrator undertakes and does not require
any particular result (such as damage or destruction) for it to be considered a
crime. 45 The perpetrator must possess dolus directus of the first degree. 46 These
include crimes in Articles 8(2)(b)(i) to 8(2)(b)(iii) where the perpetrator is
39
Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 65
(Feb. 8, 2010).
40
Id.
41
William Schabas, Al Mahdi Has Been Convicted of a Crime He Did Not Commit, 49 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 75, 77–84 (2017).
42
Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, (Guinea Bissau v. Senegal) Judgement, 1991
I.C.J. Rep. 53, ¶ 48 (Nov. 12).
43
MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 427
(2009).
44
KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME I: FOUNDATIONS AND GENERAL
PART 272 (2013).
45
KNUT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 215 (2004).
46
Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 93.
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culpable for intentionally directed attacks, 47 and Articles 8(2)(b)(vii) to
8(2)(b)(viii) where the perpetrator is responsible for merely employing weapons
of a certain kind. 48 The second type, the result crimes, would not punish the
perpetrator for conduct unless specific repercussions have arisen. 49 These crimes
would require dolus directus of the first or second degree. 50 The specific results
are unusually enumerated, ranging from inter alia destruction of the adversary’s
property, 51 deportation and forcible transfer of population, 52 pillage, 53 rape, 54 to
outrages upon personal dignity. 55 There is a clear difference in circumstance,
intent, and conduct involved in (1) attacking an undefended town, village, or
building that is not a military objective, and (2) destruction of the enemy’s
property. 56 Thus, the crime of “attacking” is different from mere “destruction”—
a conclusion that also holds true for crimes against cultural property.
b. Teleological Approach
This approach involves testing the validity of an interpretation against its
consonance with the object and purpose of the treaty. 57 The Rome Statute aims
to end impunity for crimes that shock the conscience of the world community,
while striving to protect the defendant’s rights by espousing the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege. 58 Constricting the interpretation of the term “attack” to
merely combat action would not transgress the object and purpose of the treaty.
If cultural property is damaged, either during occupation, or outside of battle,
the crime would still be subsumed within the crimes of destruction of property
of the enemy or pillage. This interpretation would serve the dual rule of
combating impunity, while also preserving the defendant’s rights to lex praevia,
lex certa, lex stricta, and lex scripta. 59
AMBOS, supra note 44, at 242.
Id. at 263.
49
Id. at 242.
50
Id. at 275.
51
Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 8(2)(b)(xiii).
52
Id. (viii).
53
Id. (xvi).
54
Id. (xxii).
55
Id. (xxi).
56
Id. (v), (xiii).
57
OLIVER DORR & KIRSTEN SCHMALENBACH, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
COMMENTARY 545 (2012).
58
See generally Amnesty Int’l, International Criminal Court: US efforts to obtain impunity for genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes (2002).
59
A person may only be punished if the charge refers to conduct that was criminalized by a clear and
certain (lex certa) written law (lex scripta), which applies at the time of its commission (lex praevia) and is not
applied or extended by analogy (lex stricta). See generally AMBOS, supra note 44, at 90.
47
48
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c. Subsequent Practice
Subsequent practice under Article 31(2)(b) includes the interpretation and
application of a constitutive treaty by organs authorized to do exactly that. 60
Subsequent practice has revealed conflicting jurisprudential strands in the ICC
about the meaning of “attack.” 61 Primary divergence exists between the Al
Mahdi Chamber on the one hand, and the Ntaganda and Katanga Pre-Trial
Chambers on the other. 62 The Pre-Trial Chamber in the Katanga case noted that
Article 8(2)(b)(i) was part of a series of war crimes referred to as the “conduct
of hostilities war crimes” because the crime necessarily had to occur during the
conduct of hostilities to fulfil the element of “attack.” 63 Therefore, if a party is
subjected to any crime after it is within the hands of an adversary, it will not be
a crime that includes “attack” as an element. A similar view was reiterated in the
Ntaganda Pre-Trial Chamber, where the court observed that an attack must be a
method of warfare closely connected to hostilities, i.e., the conduct must occur
during hostilities. 64 Indeed, for the confirmation of the charge of Article
8(2)(e)(iv) in the Ntaganda case, the application of such a requirement is
implicit. 65
The seemingly contradictory view espoused by the Trial Chamber in the Al
Mahdi decision was that the Statute does not mandate that attacks occur only
during hostilities and, therefore, the court must refrain from reading any such
distinction within it. 66 Furthermore, the Court based its decision on two refutable
reasons. First, the Chamber said that the Ntaganda and Katanga cases pertained
to attacks against civilians—not property—and, therefore, those decisions
would not be relevant in this instance. 67 Second, the Chamber reasoned that
Article 8(2)(e)(iv) was based on Articles 27 and 56 of the Hague Regulations,
which encompassed attacks during and outside the conduct of hostilities. 68
However, as noted in scholarly opinion, the Court was speaking about a series
of war crimes linked to “battlefield attacks,” and Article 8(2)(e)(iv) was a
DORR & SCHMALENBACH, supra note 57, at 537.
See generally Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. IIC-01/04-01/07, Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of
the Statute (Mar. 7, 2014); Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgement and Sentence (Sept.
27, 2016).
62
Id.
63
Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation
of charges, ¶ 267 (Sept. 30, 2008).
64
Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of
the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ¶¶ 46, 47 (Jun. 9, 2014).
65
Id. ¶¶ 69–71.
66
Al Mahdi, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 15.
67
Id. ¶ 16.
68
Id. ¶ 14.
60
61
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species of that. 69 Furthermore, the drafting history of Article 8(2)(b)(ix) reveals
that this version of the Article was deliberately chosen to specifically reflect
Article 27 of the Hague Regulations of 1907. There is no mention of Article 56,
an Article that protects cultural property from seizure or destruction during
occupation.
In the Al Mahdi case, although Al Mahdi was ultimately convicted, the
crimes were committed in Timbuktu, when the city was securely under the
control of the rebel group Ansar-Al-Dine. This lends support to the opinion that
Article 56, and not Article 27, is more appropriate for the crime Al Mahdi
committed in rebel-occupied Mali, and a sufficient reason for him to have not
been convicted under Article 8(2)(e)(iv). 70 Moreover, the Trial Chamber for the
Ntaganda case contemplated the meaning of an “attack” under Article
8(2)(e)(iv). The Chamber noted that neither the attack on a church which had
taken place “sometime after the assault, and therefore not during the actual
conduct of hostilities,” and the pillaging of a hospital, met the definition of an
“attack” under Article 8(2)(e)(iv). 71 However, the shelling of another hospital
did fall within the ambit of this element. 72 Thus, the Chamber did seem to ratify
the meaning of “attack” as followed in the Pre-Trial decisions of the Ntaganda
and Katanga cases. 73
It is, however, pertinent to note, that in an ambiguous footnote, the Chamber
conditions its interpretation of “attack” under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) by
distinguishing between cultural objects possessing and not possessing special
status. 74 The relevant footnote 3147 reads as under “In respect of the war crime
of attacking protected objects, the Chamber’s findings do not relate to the
interpretation of an ‘attack’ under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) when cultural objects
enjoying a special status are the object of the attack. It notes that the protection
of such objects under IHL is based on different underlying rules.” 75
It is unclear if this can be considered a positive affirmation of the departures
in jurisprudence made in the Al-Mahdi judgment. Quite possibly, the Chamber
has provided an interpretation of the Statute that preserves the dictum in Al
Mahdi. Accordingly, structures which have a special status can be protected
from both attacks during hostilities and destructive assaults when the object is
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Schabas, supra note 41, at 83.
Id.
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgement, ¶¶ 1141, 1142 (July, 8 2019).
Id. ¶ 1140
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1136 (footnote 3147).
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under the control of the adversary. Any of the other enumerated objects in the
provision which are devoid of special status, including cultural objects of mere
local importance, can be protected under this provision only during attacks that
occur during hostilities.
d. Other Rules of International Law Regulating the Relations Between the
Parties
The Rome Statute was formulated in the backdrop of the Hague Regulations
and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Both sets of
treaties make the distinction between crimes committed within and outside of
the battle context. The Hague Regulations (1907) make this distinction in
Articles 27 and 56. Additional Protocol I uses three main terms with respect to
property: attacks, acts of hostility, and destruction. Article 49 of Additional
Protocol I alludes to attacks in the sense of what occurs during battle. It does not
include demolitions, destruction, or violent acts that might be carried out by a
belligerent occupant in the occupied territory. 76 The 1954 Hague Convention
and its Second Protocol also use the terms “act of hostility” and “attack” at
different places. Attacks have been interpreted in the ICTY as acts of violence
relating to “a specific military operation limited in time and place.” 77 Thus, an
“attack” is necessarily distinct from “destruction” and must occur during active
hostilities—not during occupation.
2. The Crime Must be Committed “Intentionally” and be Directed at the
Protected Object
The mental element of this crime has escaped the throes of controversy. As
previously mentioned, the crime of attacks on cultural property, being a conduct
crime, requires dolus directus of the first degree. 78 In other words, the
perpetrator must have intended to engage in the conduct constituting the attack
and must have intended to direct the attack at the cultural property with the
concrete intention of bringing about destructive or damaging effects. 79 This
requirement, that the protected object should be the object of the attack, is
essential. Illustratively, in the Ntaganda Judgment, the Chamber excluded from

MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 330 (2013).
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 52 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
78
See DORMANN, supra note 45, at 131.
79
Id.
76
77
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Article 8(2)(e)(iv) events where the attack seemed to be directed at the patients
inside of a hospital and not the hospital itself. 80
3. The Attack Must Be Carried Out Against “Cultural Property”
The provisions explicitly list what constitutes “cultural property.” 81 That the
material scope of this provision is quite wide, is evident. Between the initial
version in 1997 and the final Article adopted in 2000, the scope of property was
expanded to extend to “buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and
wounded are collected.” 82 The inclusion of education was among the final
amendments made to the provision. 83 There are, however, other features of this
element that are important to note:
a. Tangible Construction by Man
Articles 8(2)(e)(iv) and 8(2)(b)(ix) protect buildings, historic monuments,
and places. The deliberate wording of these provisions raises an important
question—would any cultural space, devoid of man-made structures qualify for
protection by these Articles, or would an attack necessarily have to be directed
against some human construction? To answer this question, it is important to
consider that the predecessor to Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv) was the
Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute. The ICTY provision required some sort of
resulting damage to the object in order to punish the offender, while the ICC
provision merely focuses on the act of attacking. 84 Therefore, ICTY
jurisprudence is of limited guidance. However, the indictments under this
Article, such as the Strugar, 85 Blaskic, 86 and Brdjanin 87 indictments and cases,
have focused on structures, objects, buildings, or sites that have been damaged.
Chambers in the ICTY have noted the destruction of religious edifices, schools,

Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgement ¶ 1143.
See id.
82
Decisions taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held 1 to 12 December 1997,
A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1, 6 (Dec. 18, 1997) 6.
83
See generally id.
84
Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, at 16.
85
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Third Amended Indictment, 4, 42 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003).
86
Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14, Amended Indictment, 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 15, 1996).
87
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Sixth Amended Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 9, 2003).
80
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churches and mosques, 88 and historical monuments, observing even the damage
of walls. 89
Thus, while “institutions” might indeed have a broader connotation than
buildings—Articles 8(2)(e)(iv) and 8(2)(b)(ix) still appear to only subsume manmade structures. The logical conclusion to draw from a plain reading of the
statute, while considering the jurisprudence of the ICC, is that an attack must be
launched against some sort of building, structure, or tangible object created by
humans or a place that has a structural contribution by man. In the Pre-Trial
Chamber decisions in the Al Mahdi and Ntaganda cases, the Court noted that
protected buildings and/or structures were targeted, 90 buildings and objects were
attacked through pillage, and damage was inflicted on infrastructure. 91 The Al
Mahdi Trial Chamber specifically referred to the fact that buildings and/or
monuments were attacked. 92 While the 1972 World Heritage Convention predated the Rome Statute, it appears that Articles 8(2)(e)(iv) and 8(2)(b)(ix) do not
envision protecting natural heritage with cultural value, only cultural heritage
with some sort of man-made addition. This is evidenced by the fact that the
Rome Statute has a different provision for protection of the environment in
Article 8(2)(b)(iv). The protection of “property” of the adversary from
destruction by Article 8(2)(e)(xii) would indicate that in a non-international
armed conflict, this Article is broadly construed to include harm to the
environment. 93 Because Articles 8(2)(e)(iv) and 8(2)(b)(ix) explicitly use the
word “buildings,” a natural formation of religious significance, hallowed
grounds, or a revered forest would probably not fall within the ambit of these
charges unless some sort of man-made structure is appended or constructed
within it.

88
Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 419 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).
89
Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 53 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004).
90
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Decision on the confirmation of charges against
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ¶ 34 (Mar. 24, 2016).
91
Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of
the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ¶¶ 69–71.
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Al Mahdi, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 37.
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Daniëlla Dam-de Jong, International Law and Resource Plunder: The Protection of Natural Resources
during Armed Conflict, 19 Y.B. INT’L ENV’T L. 27, 46 (2009).
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b. Civilian-Use Determinant of Cultural Value and the Intangible
Component
There are primarily two ways to approach the protection of cultural
property—the “purpose or civilian-use test” and the “cultural value test.” 94 The
former focuses on the purpose of the property, which is also endorsed by the
Rome Statue. Buildings must be dedicated to religion, education, charitable
purposes, science or art, or must be hospitals or places where the wounded and
sick are collected to receive protection. 95 The necessity of a prevailing purpose
is implicit in all these contexts, although, generally, historical monuments
appear to be the exception. Case law from the ICTY reaffirms that the property
need only be important to the communities it was part of and need not meet the
higher thresholds of “heritage” in international law. 96 “Hospitals or places where
the wounded and sick are collected” indicates that the source of protection exists
due to the presence of protected persons or objects within these areas. 97 The
Ntaganda Trial Chamber Judgment is illustrative of this point. In making a
determination of whether the Sayo health center qualifies for protection under
article 8(2)(e)(iv), the Chamber notes “Because persons seeking treatment were
present at the Say health center, the Chamber finds that the health center was in
use as a medical facility at the time of the attack.”98 Immunity from attack would
be suspended or lost as soon as such persons or objects are removed.
The issue with a purely civilian-use approach is that it renders a limiting
element to the property, conscribing its protection to the duration for which it
has a purpose. This would grant impunity to regimes, or armed groups, which
destroy buildings and structures after declaring they no longer have a religious
value. This would also make hospitals, schools, or cultural institutions
susceptible to attacks, as they are abandoned on the fear or threat of battle. The
cultural value approach, on the other hand, would require that the properties
form a valuable part of the heritage of mankind. “Cultural and spiritual heritage
of peoples” refers to objects with an importance that transcends the borders of
countries, and which possess a uniqueness “due to their relation to the history
and culture of people.” 99 However, the cultural value approach sets a very high
94
Yaron Gottlieb, Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural Property: A Proposal for Defining New Crimes
under the Rome Statute of the ICC, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 857, 866 (2005); Michaela Frulli, The
Criminalization of Offences against Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict: The Quest for Consistency,
22 EURO. J. INT’L L. 203, 204 (2011).
95
See Rome Statute, supra note 27, arts. 8(2)(b)(ix), (e)(iv).
96
See Blaskić, Judgment, ¶¶ 419–423.
97
See Hague Regulations, 1907, supra note 11, art. 27.
98
See Ntaganda, Judgment ¶ 1147
99
CLAUDE PILLOUD, ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
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threshold for qualification as cultural property because very often this protection
is contingent on the passage of time. 100 This would depart from established
jurisprudence and defy the wording of the provision, which clearly confers
protection on any cultural property that is important to any community. The
ICTY has protected heritage, ranging from property that is hundreds of years old
as seen in the Strugar case, and property destroyed only shortly after it was built
as seen with the Donji Ahmici Mosque in the Blaskic judgment. 101
The Preparatory Committee did initially consider a cultural value approach
for the Rome Statute, but eventually discarded it. 102 From this, one may infer
that the drafters did intend to adopt a much lower threshold, closely resembling
the civilian-use approach. In the Al Mahdi Judgment, the Court observed that the
destroyed mausoleums were places of prayer and pilgrimage. 103 The Chamber
noted that the buildings did not just have religious value, but also symbolic and
emotional value, and the buildings qualified as religious because of the part they
played in cultural life in Timbuktu. 104 The victims of the crime did not just
include the inhabitants of Timbuktu, but also the international community. 105
The Prosecutor observed that visiting the mausoleums was an expression of faith
and that both locals and foreigners visit the sites to pray. 106 Furthermore, she
explained that “to protect cultural property is to protect our culture, our history,
our identity.” 107 The Court adopted an approach that clearly endorses the
civilian-use rationale of the statute, but also supported it with a value-based
approach. 108 The structures in Mali were protected for their intrinsic historical
character, the roles they played in the practices and lives of the people, and the
attached emotional worth. 109 This is part of an emerging trend in international
law to identify the values or rights underpinning international crimes. 110

GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1469 (1987).
100
See UNESCO, FIGHTING THE ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF CULTURAL PROPERTY (2018).
101
Blaskić Judgment ¶ 422.
102
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AN
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTE 90 (2005).
103
Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 34.
104
Id. ¶ 80.
105
Id. ¶¶ 46, 79.
106
Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, at the opening of
Trial in the case against Mr. Ahmad Al-Faqi Al Mahdi, International Criminal Court (Aug. 22, 2016),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-al-mahdi-160822.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
See generally UNESCO, INVESTING IN CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE (2009).
110
Ciara Laverty, What lies beneath? The turn to values in international criminal legal discourse, EJIL:
TALK! (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/tag/forcible-transfer/.
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In the Ongwen case, the Prosecutor explained that “the value protected by
the criminalization of force pregnancy...is primarily reproductive autonomy.” 111
Similarly, in the Prosecutor’s request to the ICC in the Myanmar Situation, the
Prosecutor argued that deportation and forcible transfer are separate crimes due
to the different values protected within each—a conclusion supported by the
object and purpose of the Rome Statute. 112 This kind of approach resolves the
problems associated with a strict and plain application of the “purpose test.”
Articles 8(2)(e)(iv) and 8(2)(b)(ix) implicitly encapsulate protection of
intangible cultural heritage—both the practices and rituals of the people and the
spiritual, emotional, or other values they ascribe to those structures. The
meaning of “attack” itself would indicate that it can only be incidental and not
explicit protection of cultural values because an act of violence, even if
motivated by ideological hatred, must be directed at something tangible.
Additionally, because Articles 8(2)(e)(iv) and 8(2)(b)(ix) only protect
immovable cultural property, the destruction of movable implements that
facilitate protected practices will not fall under the scope of these Articles.
c. Temporal Element
Based on the apparently limiting temporal aspect of the civilian-use
approach, one must determine the temporal element within the crime. In
examining charges and evidence with respect to attacks or destruction of cultural
property, the ICTY and the ICC have focused on the status of the property at the
time of the attack.113 The property must not be a military objective at the time
the attack is launched, and it must also clearly be recognized as an institution
dedicated to one of the enumerated purposes in the relevant statute. 114 If the
object is devoid of cultural significance when attacked, it would not fulfil the
material element of dedication to a purpose. One may logically conclude that if
a structure was part of a tradition where the intrinsic religiosity ebbed to
nothingness and the structure was firmly slated for no future use, then it would
only garner a more ordinary level of protection under another general provision.
However, if a property—periodically demolished and rebuilt as part of a
tradition—is destroyed in war before its scheduled religious demolition, this
111
Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, at the opening of
Trial in the case against Dominic Ongwen, (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=201612-06-otp-stat-ongwen.
112
ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1, Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the
Statute, (Apr. 9, 2018).
113
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Decision on the confirmation of charges against
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ¶ 36.
114
Blaskić, Judgment ¶ 185.
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would still hurt the religious sentiments of the people, thus destroying tangible,
immovable property that is intrinsic and purposeful to cultural practices. 115 This
would constitute a war crime. 116 Even in the case that the property was such that
it only had religious value when rituals were performed within, if the property
was supposed to be part of some future ritual, its designation for cultural use and
its role in cultural practices would confer protection under the value-based
approach. 117 With regard to the temporal element, the Trial Chamber in the
Ntaganda case also examined the function of the attacked objects at the time of
the assaults. 118 Because patients were situated in an attacked health center at the
time of the attack, and there was no evidence to indicate that the center had
become a military objective, the Chamber concluded that the health center was
a protected object within the scope of Article 8(2)(e)(iv). 119
CONCLUSION: THE POTENTIAL IN PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATION
Article 22 of the Rome Statute encapsulates the principle of legality, thus
limiting the liability of individuals only to those crimes that are clearly
proscribed under the statute. 120 It also emphasizes the rule of strict construction,
limiting the ability to analogize. 121 This does not however preclude the Court
from progressively clarifying the contours of an offense. 122 Moreover, although
fairly limited, the Court may employ analogies to fill interpretative gaps in
statutory offenses. This would save vaguely-worded provisions from being
deemed void, and rendering them operational in consonance with their intended
objective. The evolution of cultural property definitions and protections over the
last few decades have recognized the need for preservation, compelling respect
and igniting discussions on protection, particularly during armed conflict. The
Article 8 provisions in the Rome Statute have been infrequently invoked in the
brief history of the Court. Ahmed Al-Mahdi’s and Bosco Ntaganda’s charging
under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) perhaps mark the potential for an emphatic shift
towards cultural rights protection.
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The Preparatory Committee deliberately employed different words of
varying import for Article 8 provisions, and the language of the statute must be
adhered to. Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv) only protect tangible structures
from targeted acts of violence during battle or as part of military oriented
operations. Cultural structures are protected for the utility they offer to civilian
populations, whether for religious, artistic, scientific, educational, historical,
charitable, or medical purposes.
Criminalization of intentional war time disruptions to intangible
manifestations of cultural traditions is not a norm under customary international
law. However, progressive judicial interpretation offers a way for the Court to
clarify the extent to which intangible values—traditions, rituals, or festivals—
might be protected under Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv), either incidentally
or indirectly. Cultural value is conferred on property through a variety of factors,
including but not limited to, the intangible value of buildings, the place they
occupy in the community, and the purpose they hold for current or future use.
The scheme of the statute necessarily implies limitations in interpretation of
these provisions, but it does not obliterate or militate against the objective of
ending impunity for crimes. For any offense under international law that is not
envisioned under Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv), the statute offers
alternative provisions under Article 8 itself. 123 Acts that do not fit within the
contours of any enumerated offense, or crimes not included within the statute
either intentionally or unintentionally, fall under Article 22(3) of the statute. 124
Human rights mechanisms, special tribunals, and national forums may still
prosecute persons for such crimes.
The Ntaganda Trial Chamber lucidly demarcated the bounds of Article
8(2)(e)(iv) in a manner more consistent with the jurisprudential derivations of
the provision. However, the ambiguous footnote 3147 could potentially bridge
the differences in interpretations between the Ntaganda and Al-Mahdi cases. 125
This would allow the meaning of “attack” to be broader only when the relevant
provisions are applied to cultural objects with a special status. The next Chamber
to contemplate Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) or 8(2)(e)(iv) should consider dispelling all
doubts and decisively putting an end to all debate.
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